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ABSTRACT
Numerous event-based probing methods exist for cloud computing environ-
ments allowing a trusted hypervisor to gain insight into guest activities. Such
event based probing has been shown to be useful for detecting attacks, sys-
tem hangs through watchdogs, and also for inserting exploit detectors before
a system can be patched, among others. In this paper, we illustrate how
to use such probing for trustworthy logging and highlight some of the chal-
lenges that existing event based probing mechanisms do not address. These
challenges include ensuring a probe inserted at given address is trustworthy
despite the lack of attestation available for probes that have been inserted
dynamically. We show how probes can be inserted to ensure proper logging of
every invocation of a probed instruction. When combined with attested boot
of the hypervisor and guest machines, we can ensure the output stream of
monitored events is trustworthy. Using these techniques we build a trustwor-
thy log of certain guest-system-call events powering a cloud-tuned Intrusion
Detection System (IDS). Additionally, we identify new types of events that
must be added to existing probing systems to ensure attempts to circumvent
probes within the guest appear in the log. We highlight the overhead penal-
ties paid by guests to ensure log completeness when faced with probabilistic
attacks and show promising results (less that 10% for guests) when a guest
is willing to relax the trade-off between log completeness and overhead. Our
demonstrative IDS shows the ability to detect common attack scenarios with
simple policies built using our guest behavior recording system.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing lends itself to service oriented architectures as one can
more efficiently manage services that run as separate virtual machines. This
approach has led to virtual machine images being sold in marketplaces as
so called Virtual appliances (VAs) meant to run single services [1]. The
second aspect of cloud computing that makes it more amenable to better
IDS systems is the hypervisor’s ability to inspect guest memory to provide
new services [2, 3, 4, 5].
In previous work, we used the hypervisor as a basis for detecting rootk-
its [6]. Examples from literature have used the hypervisor to detect mal-
ware that hides itself from process-listing tools using a variety of approaches
[7, 2]. Many of these approaches either require running a second VM [8, 9],
rely heavily on knowledge about kernel data structures[10], or focus on spe-
cific types of intrusions or malware[11, 7, 2, 12]. Our approach aims to log
malicious activity so higher level services can take action before a malicious
actor has had the chance to modify kernel data structures in an effort to
circumvent detection (e.g.: remove itself from the process list).
Our logging technique utilizes hypervisor level probes such as those pre-
sented by Estrada et al. [13] and Lengyel et al. [14]. These probing tech-
niques utilize Hardware Assisted Virtualization (HAV) to allow the hypervi-
sor to insert probes into guest memory by replacing an instruction with an
instruction that causes control to transfer back to the hypervisor (through
a VMExit). The hypervisor can then inspect guest memory before transfer-
ring control back to the guest. Our IDS is built around logs gathered using
only probes placed at specifically chosen system calls. The system call in-
terface tends to be very stable and only requires knowledge regarding which
arguments are passed in which CPU registers. Specifically, we reduce the
performance impact of a probe induced VMExit’s by evaluating the detection
coverage with the minimal number of system calls probed. We build probes
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that hook two system calls in Linux, sys exec and sys open, highlight the
trade-off between performance and logging guarantees, and show an example
of a service built on top of such a log in the form of an IDS. By hooking only
certain system calls we aim to lower the performance penalty paid by guests
(by logging less information) while increasing the costs to execute a successful
attack against the guest (by limiting the actions that can be taken without
being logged). We do not protect against every attack on the guest, but we
aim to protect against attacks on the logging system that originates from
the guest while increasing the burden of performing unloggable malicious
activity.
In this paper we exploit the “appliance” nature of cloud computing to
develop a service oriented IDS that is easy to manage, has few false posi-
tives, and is built upon a trustworthy logging service running inside of the
hypervisor. We have implemented our system on Linux 3.13 (Ubuntu 14.04
LTS) as the KVM hypervisor host, and are able to detect intrusions into
the popular blogging framework Wordpress. Additionally, we explore how
event based probing systems can be loaded before the probed instruction(s)
have the chance to execute even once. Probe insertion before execution is
guaranteed by inducing a unique sequence of page faults in the hardware
accelerated guest-physical-address to host-physical-address translation avail-
able in modern processors. By combining existing trusted boot techniques
for both the hypervisor and guests, write protecting the probed instruction,
and monitoring specific hardware registers, we can guarantee event log com-
pleteness. Note that currently we do not monitor other hardware generated
events, such as those stemming from a Base Management Controller (BMC).
We show that the integrity of the probe cannot be fully guaranteed by exist-
ing probe based monitoring system and that two more traps which transfer
control back to the hypervisor must be added to ensure correctness of a sys-
tem call based log. Our contributions include a methodology for building
trustworthy services that must use data from untrustworthy guests and the
identification of the events that must be logged to guarantee the integrity of
any data driven response such a system may produce.
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1.1 Goals of a Hypervisor-Based Trusted Log
We set forward four requirements that must be met to guarantee the integrity
of a trusted log meant to monitor guest Virtual Machines (VM’s). Again,
while this logging does not prevent attacks on guests, it can reduce the num-
ber of attack-related events that go unlogged. Guaranteeing the integrity
and completeness of our trusted log provides guarantees for future work in
higher level services built using such a log. The requirements are as follows:
R1 Information provided by the guest cannot alter the logging entity’s
control flow. Information is simply logged and higher level services can
respond to logged data appropriately,
R2 Guests cannot modify or remove an event from the log after the fact,
R3 In-guest modifications to instrumented locations should be logged,
R4 Modifications to functions invoking the hooked instruction should sim-
ilarly be logged,
R5 The event log must contain every event T of type T if there exists any
probe PT in the set of probes which produces output corresponding to
events of type T , up to and including a malicious action within the
guest.
We also have three design goals that drive the engineering choices behind
the architecture proposed here. These are:
D1 Minimize the performance impact on guests,
D2 Minimize additions to the trusted compute base, and also
D3 Require no modification of guests (i.e., transparent to end users).
R1 implies that probes must not trust memory read from guests. In par-
ticular, probes must not trust the guest to inform the logging function of
appropriate bound lengths. This requires that thorough bounds checking is
performed on memory inspected from the guest and requires reasonable stop-
ping points for data structures that need the size parameter to be inferred
from guest memory. Setting limits also protects against maliciously linked
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recursive data structures. This ensures that a compromised guest cannot
affect probe behavior.
R2 requires that a malicious guest can neither modify nor prevent the
logging of an event T occurring at time tx in any time tx+n the (i.e.: future
actions in the guests cannot alter previously logged operations). Event-based
logging ensures that the executions of probed instructions in the guest are
captured in the log right away. Preventing log modifications by guests ensures
that events captured cannot be deleted or modified by guests even if the guest
reformats media or terminates.
R3 allows services built on top of the log to decide how much trust to
place in events captured in the log after a modification event. For instance,
if an administrator observes a modification event mod at time tx she can de-
cide to trust or not trust the events logged after time tx depending on other
available information. For example, a non-malicious kprobe may have caused
the modification event. We only guarantee that the event will appear in the
log and leave any event classification up to higher-level services. Recording
potential attempts to circumvent logging ensures that higher-level applica-
tions have sufficient information to classify events. R4 guarantees that an
attacker cannot circumvent logging by simply redirecting calls to the func-
tions of interest. In our case, that means write protecting both system call
and sys call table and the preceding call stack. The call stack includes
the sys call table indicating the memory locations of the specific system
call handlers, the general system call handler system call and the hardware
registers indicating which block of code to execute after performing an in-
terrupt. In the case of hooking only the general system call handler, only
modifications to system call and the hardware registers (such as the idt
register) must be monitored. We elaborate more on monitoring events and
the specific registers that need to be monitored in Section 3.2.2.
When combined with R2, R3, and R4, R5 can guarantee that every event
of interest up to and including an attempt to circumvent logging is recorded
ensuring completeness. Log completeness is required because the trust placed
in the events occurring at some time point tx relies upon the integrity of every
event logged between when logging can begin, time t0, and the time of the
event immediately preceding event x at time tx−1. If any event before event x
is determined to be malicious, then we may decide that the details of an event
occurring at time tx cannot be trusted. Thus, if a service cannot review the
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events occurring between time t0 and when a probe is inserted, the service
cannot determine the integrity of any event. The situation of missing data
can occur during guest boot; exiting tools built on event based probing insert
probes at some time tb+n. If a malicious action occurs between when the
system boots, tb, and when the probe is inserted, then it will go unlogged by
directly applying the instruction replacement event based probing technique
mentioned in literature. We present a method to guarantee a probe is inserted
before any invocation of the instruction it is replacing. To the best of our
knowledge this paper is the first work that considers completeness of guest
kernel-based events logged using trusted probes. We do not currently support
the ability to log dynamically generated code that modifies itself after boot.
Code generated as part of the boot sequence and never again can be probed
successfully.
Apart from the requirements R1 – R5, an additional goal of our system is
to impose low overheads to remain practical. D1 dictates that any attempts
at logging must pose minimal performance impact on guests while also being
transparent (D3). These two design goals ensure that any ensuing architec-
ture remain feasible for production workloads. Our final design goal (D2)
requires that we keep probing functions to the minimal required for logging
in order to minimize additional attack surface. Below we discuss how we
can achieve these goals through the use of probing techniques, novel guest
boot sequence analysis, and well placed probes. The result is a secure and
trustworthy logging service on which meaningful higher-level services can be
built.
5
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 Hardware Assisted Virtualization
The x86 architecture was not originally designed with virtualization in mind,
but as VM’s became popular hardware manufacturers looked at ways to im-
prove their performance and robustness. Both AMD and Intel have released
support for HAV in the form of extensions to the x86 instruction set.
HAV allows a VM to execute instructions natively on the hypervisor’s
CPU(s). However, the hypervisor must maintain control of the VM’s exe-
cution. When the CPU is executing a VM’s instructions, VMExit events are
generated for any privileged operations that the VM attempts. A VMExit
transfers control from the VM to the hypervisor allowing the hypervisor to
perform any necessary operations before returning control back to the VM.
While allowing for robust and simplified hypervisor software, VMExit’s do
incur performance overhead. Historically, one of the major causes of overhead
in HAV was due to page faults in the VM. In earlier HAV implementations,
every page fault would result in a VMExit since the guest could not control
its own page tables. To alleviate this, vendors introduced a technique called
two-dimensional page tables (TDP). In this paper we utilize Intel’s TDP
implementation, known as Extended Page Tables (EPT). The techniques
apply to AMD’s equivalent Nested Page Tables (NPT).
EPT allows VM’s to manage their own page tables by managing guest-
physical to host-physical address translations in hardware, effectively elimi-
nating VMExit’s on page faults.
In EPT, there are two layers of page tables that must be traversed for
guest memory accesses. Similar to conventional x86 page tables, EPT also
provides a set of access flags that can be set at the page level: execute enable,
write enable, and read enable. A VMExit is triggered on accesses that violate
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the access flags due to an EPT violation. For example, if writes have been
disabled for a page within a guest, an EPT violation VMExit is triggered on
any write attempts to that page, and must be handled within the hypervisor.
We later show how EPT access flags can be used to guarantee that probing
systems do not miss events of interest occurring within the guest, fulfilling
R5. For more information on EPT we refer the reader to Volume 3 of the
Intel Software Development Manuals [15]; for AMD’s equivalent NPT the
reader can refer to Volume 2 of AMD’s Programmer Manual [16].
2.2 Virtual Machine Monitor based Probing
Our work focuses on an audit log of guest-instructions by recording key events
to add an extra layer of protection. Here, we highlight the mechanism used
to enable such logging. Event based probing using debugging techniques has
been proposed and applied in a number of different contexts [14, 17, 13, 18].
Lengyel et al. use event based probing for dynamic analysis of malware
with the goal of remaining undetected during monitoring [14]. Estrada et.
al. show the effectiveness of similar techniques for reliability and security
monitoring [13, 19]. XenProbes uses the technique for profiling performance
inside guests [17] and Spider uses it for stealthy debugging [18].
All of these approaches utilize HAV to invoke VMExits upon execution of
int3 (0xCC) instructions in the guest. The key feature of event based probing
is that an instruction within an untrusted environment can be replaced by
an instruction (int3 in this case) that causes a hardware enforced trap (i.e.,
a VMExit) to transfer control flow to a trusted environment. After guest
inspection is done, the original instruction is executed within the guest and
the breakpoint is re-inserted before guest execution resumes. Because probes
cause a VMExit, which is an expensive operation, one must carefully design
services built on such probes to reduce the number of exit events while also
ensuring enough information is available to ensure meaningful services can
be developed utilizing the logged data. We do not consider the event based
approached used by LibVMI [20] as it invokes a VMExit on every single
instruction in the target page for the logged event. Such an approach causes
high overhead and is intractable due to our performance requirement D1.
Our approach gives users the flexibility to determine the overhead paid based
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on the level of protection deemed necessary for a given application.
Instruction replacement techniques for event based monitoring differ sub-
stantially from the event based monitoring used in libraries such as LibVMI
[20]. LibVMI “inserts” probes by simply marking the page containing the
probed instruction as non-executable within the two dimensional page table
structures. Any time an instruction on that page is executed, an excep-
tion is raised and the hypervisor must ensure the offending address is the
“probed” instruction before performing any action. We use the finer grained
instruction-level probes discussed in the literature and referenced above. Ad-
ditionally, we limit ourselves to only on event based systems. The research
community has shown that timer based guest introspection (passive mon-
itoring) can be easily circumvented by a malicious or compromised guest
[21, 22].
2.3 The Semantic Gap
Any Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) application must cross the “Se-
mantic Gap” - the gap faced by developers of code running within the Virtual
Machine Monitor (VMM) that must inspect guest memory with no knowl-
edge of the kernel data structures or memory layout of the guest. Much
research has been done in this area, and we point the reader to the overview
done by Hebbal et al. for a more thorough discussion of the issue and many
of the proposed solutions [23]. For this work, we assume that the address of
the sys exec and sys open calls in Linux, along with the offset at which the
Linux kernel .text addressing begins are provided (this memory mapping
is well documented [24]). The latter is needed in order to identify the guest
physical locations of the above functions (which are loaded into memory be-
fore paging is enabled in the guest). In Section 3.2 we discuss in more detail
why this is necessary.
We favor the approach of querying System.Map for the location of relevant
functions due to ease of access; this approach has shown to be successful in
the literature for providing a low cost method for crossing the semantic gap
[5, 17, 9]. We limit our discussion to Linux guests as the open source nature
of Linux lends itself to easier distribution of VAs, the focus of our IDS, but a
similar approach of querying the debug symbols for the Windows kernel has
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also been met with success [14, 9].
We have intentionally made an effort to keep probed functions to a min-
imum and have limited ourselves to probing simple kernel functions as op-
posed to kernel data structures in order to limit the size of the trusted com-
pute base (D2). As we show in Section 4.2, initial results indicate that many
attacks can be detected with minimal probing, thus reducing not only the
impact of the semantic gap issue, but the size of the trusted compute base
as well. We also assume that the guest kernel is booted using an attestation
technique. This allows probes to trust that the kernel being probed pre-
serves the few properties necessary for probing, such as the address of the
instruction to be probed.
2.4 Virtual Appliances
VA1
Reverse 
Proxy
VA3-n
Application 
Server
VA2
Database 
Server
VA3-n
Application 
Server
VA3-n
Application 
Server
VA3-n
Application 
Server
Figure 2.1: Typical Virtual Appliance Based Deployment of a Web
Application
VAs are a popular method for deploying cloud services. One can sim-
ply choose an appliance from a list of images made available on a cloud
provider’s marketplace and immediately deploy services such as databases
or web servers with minimal configuration. The tuned nature of these ap-
pliances makes their behavior more predicable than a VM used for general
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purpose computation. In this paper we present an IDS that leverages the
“appliance” nature of cloud based deployments instantiated using VAs. The
IDS is built using guest event driven hypervisor-level probes to deliver rele-
vant information to the policy compliance layer.
A typical deployment of a cloud based web application is shown in Figure
2.1 which shows a reverse proxy routing requests to an application process-
ing layer, each of which communicate with a database before returning a
response. We envision a system for which different policies protect each kind
of VA. For Figure 2.1 there would be three main policies, one for VA1 the
reverse proxy, one for VA2 the database and one for VA’s 3 through N which
serve as the application server(s). Policies can share layers if VAs are built
using the same base distribution as a single distribution will have the same
cron binaries running for example. While policies are stackable, the main
advantages reside in the policies for each that differ, allowing for good cov-
erage while limiting false positives. For example, a database server running
MySQL should never execute a shell outside of configuration events; our
monitoring system would detect such an operation as a violation. The event
log can then also be used as compliance monitoring during configuration pe-
riods, and could serve as a method to detect insider threats attempting to
re-configure applications in an attempt to cause unstable behavior.
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CHAPTER 3
DESIGN
3.1 Attack Model
We assume that the hypervisor is a trusted entity and that the hypervisor
side of the logging framework is secure. For the log file itself, a simple way to
provide guarantees is to use remote logging, or approaches used in literature
[25]. Here, we focus on the elements of logging that must be in place to
facilitate proper logging of a guest that may become malicious at some point
after boot. We assume that the hypervisor is using trusted boot, thus the
integrity can be attested. Additionally, we assume that guests running on
the hypervisor are also using attested boot mechanisms or guest kernels are
known, non-malicious builds of Linux. This allows the hypervisor to guaran-
tee the integrity of any guest kernel before the guest boots. We assume that
the guest kernel is not malicious until after the first user-space program runs.
This is a reasonable assumption as attempts to exploit a kernel will come from
software loaded after boot (either malicious software will be loaded or vul-
nerable software exploited). Attacks can come in the form of modifications
to guest memory, writes to guest registers (such as Model Specific Registers
(MSRs), or the IDT) in an attempt to modify the location of the system call
handler. We assume that the kernel can be fully compromised anytime after
boot. Attacks can include loading kernel modules, modification of the kernel
in place, or attempts to circumvent the scheduling of processes on the sys-
tem. An attacker may try and copy the page of memory with the replaced
instruction, fix said instruction, and redirect system calls to this new page.
Such a redirect would either require modification of the Interrupt Descriptor
Table in memory that is referenced to by the general system call handler or
may come as a write to a hardware register in an effort to circumvent the
code block executed after an interrupt.
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3.2 Trustworthy Log
We start with our attack model and then show how through log acquisition
and careful consideration of event types we can protect against such a model.
Additionally, we explore the performance trade-off associated with log guar-
antees and highlight an approach we feel is a reasonable trade-off in providing
a defense in depth solution. Based on our design requirements listed above,
we guarantee that certain malicious activity within the guest can be logged
and that every attempt to circumvent logging will be logged.
The guarantee we provide is that malicious activity with the goal of by-
passing the logging mechanism will appear in the output log. These log
events are the minimal required to enable trustworthy logging. We also show
how relaxing this guarantee allows for much faster performance of the logging
interface without a large increase in attack space that cannot be monitored.
With a trustworthy logging mechanism in place, we can consider other events
for logging that will reduce the size of the attack space that will go unlogged.
The goal is to provide enough logging that an attacker will have difficulty in
launching meaningful attacks while going unnoticed.
3.2.1 Log Acquisition
Figure 3.1 highlights how we probe the Linux kernel system calls sys exec
and sys open. As mentioned above, we utilize an int3 based probing mech-
anism to replace instructions in the guest kernel, ensuring information is
logged anytime the affected functions are called, fulfilling R2.
To ensure that any attempt to modify a probe is logged (R3) we use EPTs
to remove write permissions for the affected page, register a callback to han-
dle these EPT violations, and within the callback handler only log attempts
to modify the affected page if the violation occurs for the guest virtual ad-
dress on which we inserted the probe. This gives administrators knowledge
of attempts to subvert the logging system. While kprobes within the guest
might cause non-malicious writes to locations of logging probes, an adminis-
trator would know the event is benign. Event classification is left to higher
level services, we simply guarantee that modification events do appear in
the log. Logging code also remains small, making formal verification more
feasible. There are only 72 and 41 lines of code for our sys exec logger and
12
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Figure 3.1: Event Driven Probe Architecture
sys open logger respectively (not including the code required to insert the
probes), keeping in line with D2. To ensure R4 is met, we must consider ev-
ery attack vector that could be used to circumvent logging. For every attack
AT there must be an event corresponding to actions of type T . Consider the
following list of attacks that could circumvent logging:
A1 Rewrite replaced instruction(s) with the original instruction.
A2 Rewrite the general system call handler to reference a new, attacker
supplied, Interrupt Descriptor Table.
A3 Rewrite the entry for the specific system call being hooked in the Inter-
rupt Descriptor Table to point to an attacker supplied handle for the
system call.
A4 Write to either the IDTR register (for legacy int $80 based system
calls) or various MSRs for so called “fast” system calls to force the
hardware to invoke a malicious code block after interrupts (See Section
3.2.2 for a more detailed discussion of the specific registers).
A5 Probabilistically insert an interrupt after a system call (that is being
logged) is made. Upon interruption, modify the thread struct of the
system call invoking process to point to a different system call handler
upon being re-scheduled.
In section 3.2.2 we highlight how each attack is accounted for through
hardware enforced events. It is worth noting here that A5 would require
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careful timing and is unclear if such an attack can be carried out successfully.
Assuming it can be, such an attack would be probabilistic and not guaranteed
to work for every system call made. We later discuss how removing the A5
constraint greatly reduces the performance impact and we believe it has
minimal affects on the overall trustworthyness of our logging architecture.
In future work, we will look at dynamically paying the performance penalty
to protect against A5 by analyzing guests and dynamically moving probe
locations if an attack is more probable based on logged data.
In order to ensure log completeness and fulfill R5 we must place probes in
their respective locations before the instructions at those locations are exe-
cuted. The system calls being probed will be loaded at a predictable location
within the guest physical memory (as noted in Linux’s memory mapping doc-
umentation [24]). The knowledge of these locations allows us to determine
the page number indicating the page containing the target instruction, which
we use to watch for EPT violations of any guest physical address that oc-
curs on the same page as an instruction of interest during the guest boot
sequence. We are able to watch for such violations by utilizing a callback
handler that gets called after KVM performs any necessary actions to handle
the violation. Upon observing the first write violation for any address within
the page of interest, we remove the execute bit from that page, allowing our
callback handler to be invoked if any instruction on the page is executed.
Subsequently, upon observation of any instruction execution on the page of
interest, we know that the remaining code for that page must be loaded and
can safely insert the probe. Having inserted the probe, we restore EPT per-
missions to allow execution and remove our checks for EPT violations due to
execution exceptions on the page in which the probe is inserted as the checks
are only required as the final step before probe insertion. By inserting probes
in this manner during boot of guests, we are able to ensure log completeness
and log every call to these two system calls, even while the first userspace
applications are being started.
Finally, we must ensure that the actions taken within the probe do not
place unwarranted trust in data obtained from the guest (R1). For example,
our sys exec logger logs two variable length string arrays. While these string
are typically \0 terminated, the guest could point the probe to a location
with an arbitrarily large number of bytes before a \0 is encountered. To
protect against copying strings from guest memory, we only copy 500 bytes
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and place a \0 at the 500th byte. While we may log garbage data in cases of
an intentionally malicious guest and may truncate binary names in the case of
exceptionally long, but legitimate, calls to sys exec, this is a necessary trade
off to ensure the probing interface remains resilient. Potential for truncating
can be seen again when iterating through variable length arrays, which should
be NULL terminated. We only iterate over up to 50 entries and exit iteration
if NULL is encountered (in a legitimate case) and stop at 50 in the case of
a malicious guest pointing the probe to a random memory location. Again,
this has the side effect of potentially truncating logged arguments. In our
experiments, we never truncated any legitimate data. Logging code also
remains small, making formal verification more feasible. There are only 72
and 41 lines of code for our sys exec logger and sys open logger respectively
(not including the code required to insert the probes). In our experiments
these length decisions did not have an affect on the effectiveness of the IDS.
3.2.2 Events Logged
In addition to the information listed for each event type as defined below, all
events also include the hostname of the KVM hypervisor on which the event
occurs, a timestamp for the event, and the vmid (the qemu-kvm process id
of the VM on the host on which the event is logged).
The three event types currently implemented in our system, and informa-
tion collected unique to that type, are as follows:
• Tse - sys exec events containing: filename, argv, and envp
– filename - a \0 delineated string.
– argv - a NULL delineated variable length array containing string
pointers.
– envp - a NULL delineated variable length array containing string
pointers.
• Tso - sys open events containing: filename, mode and flags.
– filename - a \0 delineated string.
– flags - an integer flags variable indicating options for the file.
– mode - an integer indicating the mode for the file being opened.
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• Tmod - Probe modification events containing: gva
– gva - A long integer indicating the guest virtual address being
modified.
The following two events are unique to logging system calls and provide
guarantees that malware within the guest is unable to circumvent the logging
mechanism. These require additional callbacks be provided by the underlying
probing framework; we save implementation of these events for future work.
These two events are not currently provided by any event based monitoring
framework in the literature [13, 17, 14].
• Tlidt - lidt event. Triggered on execution of the lidt (Load interrupt
descriptor table) x86 instruction.
• Twrmsr - wrmsr event. Triggered on execution of the wrmsr (Write
Model Specific Regsiter) x86 instruction.
These two events are hardware enforced; once the hypervisor has config-
ured the processor to trap these calls, their execution will always force a
VMExit. The lidt trap can be configured by setting bit 2 (Descriptor Ta-
ble Exiting) of the MSR IA32 VMX PROCBASED CTLS2 model specific register
to 1 within the hypervisor before VM’s are started. Similarly, writes to
model specific registers within the guests can be trapped by setting bit 28 of
the same model specific register to 0. For int $80 based system calls, the
lidt trap is sufficient. For sysenter invoked system calls, the three MSRs
IA32 SYSENTER {ES, EIP, ESP}must be monitored through the wrmsr trap.
Finally, for syscall invoked system calls, the MSR IA32 LSTAR must be mon-
itored with the wrmsr trap. The registers listed above are used to register
Interrupt Service Routines (ISRs) with the processor; in Linux, these point
to the general system call handler. The performance impact of these two
events is negligible under normal operation as these events occur only during
boot of the guest kernel and during configuration of MSRs.
Let us now consider how these event types can protect against the attacks
listed above. Attacks A1, A2, and A3 can be protected by properly remov-
ing the write enable bits for the pages containing the instruction modified,
the general system call handler, and the interrupt descriptor table and lis-
tening to events of type Tmod. The event Tmod is hardware enforced by EPT.
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Attempts to modify pages for which the write enable bit has been removed
will trigger a VMExit through an EPT violation. Attacks that try to change
the ISR for system calls (A4 above) can be logged with events of type Tlidt
and Twrmsr; again, these are hardware enforced events. Finally, careful place-
ment of probes can ensure that logging occurs before interrupts have been
re-enabled by placing the probe on the general system call handler, mitigat-
ing attack A5. Mitigating A5 does have high performance impact as we
discuss in Section 3.3; we believe placing the probe at the general system call
handler is a reasonable trade-off as attacks of this kind would be unreliable.
Note that many more event types are possible as event based probing
provides a trusted mechanism with which to hook any kernel function. But in
keeping with D1 and D2, we choose to keep this number small. In this work,
each event type T above corresponds to an equivalent probe PT inserted into
each guest. An interesting area for future research (discussed more in Section
6) is building new event types based on the output of the above events types.
For instance, a new apt-get type could be defined to allow an administrator
to write fine grained policies regarding arguments to apt-get on a particular
machine. These apt-get events would be not require additional probing
as all the information required is already stored within the sys exec event.
Such an approach would allow for more dynamic auditing approaches while
not impacting the size of the trusted compute base as any such event types
would be based on the trusted log and not on the addition of (potentially
fragile) probes into guest memory. Future work will explore adding more
probes in to improve the efficacy of higher level services while minimizing
performance costs to guests.
3.2.3 Logging Format
At this point, we are placing all probe output into /var/log/kern.log and
then processing the output with a user space application to build and then
processes events. This process is show in Figure. 3.2 below. In order to allow
for easier processing by higher level applications, we adhere to a JSON like
format when doing logging within the host kernel.
A log sample for a touch text.log event looks like the following:
Listing 3.1: Example sys open Probe Output
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{"VMID": 1884, "LOGGER": "SYS_OPEN_LOGGER", "KIND": "BEGIN"}
{"VMID": 1884, "LOGGER": "SYS_OPEN_LOGGER", "KIND": "ARG",
"ARG_NAME": "filename", "VALUE": "test.text"}
{"VMID": 1884, "LOGGER": "SYS_OPEN_LOGGER", "KIND": "ARG",
"ARG_NAME": "flags", "VALUE": "0x941"}
{"VMID": 1884, "LOGGER": "SYS_OPEN_LOGGER", "KIND": "ARG",
"ARG_NAME": "mode", "VALUE": "0x1b6"}
{"VMID": 1884, "LOGGER": "SYS_OPEN_LOGGER", "KIND": "END"}
The TIMESTAMP, HOSTNAME and LOG ID are also included and are set by the
printk function within the hypervisor. We trust these fields to be accurate
when read by higher level tools. The accuracy of these fields is important as
will be discussed in the next section on the development of higher level tools.
For each event, we have a BEGIN statement and an END statement. Every-
thing in between those statements make up the body of the event and are
used to log parameters read from the guest.
3.3 Intrusion Detection System for Virtual Appliances
To highlight our approach to services built on top of an event based trust-
worthy log, we have developed an IDS which triggers alerts on violations
of filename white-lists. The checks are performed on filenames passed to
guest sys exec and sys open calls. To enable ease of use, we have also built
a policy recorder that translates guest events to white-list policies during
recording.
The architecture of our intrusion detection system is show in Figure 3.2.
Raw probe logs are transferred from kernel to user space using the /var/log/
kern.log interface. From there, the logs are placed in a buffer as they are
read from the file. An ioctl interface to /var/log/kern.log is used to en-
sure updates are pushed to the user space application as soon as probes write
to the file. Within the user space event parser, buffers must be used to ensure
that output from a probe P 1so into guest G1 do not become integrated into an
event 2 from the output of the probe P
2
so placed into guest G2, as the arrival
of such logs may be intermingled within /var/log/kern.log. This is en-
sured by placing all logs from a given probe into a unique buffer identified by
the LOGGER TYPE,HOSTNAME,VMID sequence. As mentioned previously, since
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Output Log
TIME: VMID: X, …, LOGGER: SYS_EXEC, BEGIN
TIME: VMID: X, …, LOGGER: SYS_EXEC, ARG
TIME: VMID: X, …, LOGGER: SYS_EXEC, END
…
TIME: VMID: Y, …, LOGGER: SYS_EXEC, BEGIN
…
Event Based Probing
SysExecProbe
SysOpenProbe
Event Parsing
Log Buffer
{B1,A1,…,E1} -> Event ɛ1
{Bn,An,…,En} -> Event ɛn
…
Policies
{exec: {filename: 
/sbin/dhclient-script}}
{open: {read_only, filename: 
/sbin/resolvconf}}
Alert System
Policy 
Reader
Event 
Monitor & 
Policy 
Alerts
Policy Recorder
Event ɛ1-> Policy P1
…
Event ɛn -> Policy P2
Figure 3.2: Trustworthy-Log Driven IDS Architecture
the buffer being used is determined by these sequence of values, these values
must be set by the hypervisor. To ensure the guest can not impact actions
taken by the logging system, no value read from the guest is used to identify a
probed event or which buffer in which to place a logged statement. For now,
we do not consider multiple vCPU guests, thus only need to worry about
intermingling between guests. In the case of multiple vCPUs, the vCPU id
would also need to be used as a unique identifier as it would be possible that
a probed location be called from multiple vCPUs simultaneously. Extending
this approach to multiple vCPU based guests will be done in future work.
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We note here however that there are certain limitations to our approach
that would allow an attacker to commit a malicious action without being
logged. Consider a vulnerable binary running on a system that is compro-
mised through a buffer overflow attack. Assuming the attacker does not
crash the binary, it might be possible to run code under the guise of an
already executing process. As long as the payload never opened a file or
executed another binary, it would go unlogged. However, our approach sub-
stantially reduces the actions that can be taken by an attacker. Adding a
separate event for system calls dealing with network access further mitigates
the possibility that a malicious payload is able to do any useful work with-
out being logged. This can be combined with ASLR, non-executable heaps
and other defenses to increase the cost of a successful attack. On the other
hand, all attempts to modify the logging facility are logged (depending on
the performance trade-off chosen for a given guest).
After event parsing is complete, processed events are passed to either a
policy recording layer or an alert system for our IDS. The policy recording
system allows an administrator to record standard behavior for a VA in
terms of white-listing the actions taken during policy recording. Listing
3.2 shows an example policy built using our policy recorder while executing
the which command on a guest under inspection. Currently, white-lists are
separated from attackers executing in the guest by the VMM. In future work
we will investigate using attestation mechanisms for the white-list and while-
list enforcing mechanism.
Listing 3.2: Example which.policy file
{ "policies": [
{"exec": {"type": "whitelist","filename":"/usr/bin/which"}},
{"open": {"type": "whitelist","access_type": "read",
"filename": "/etc/ld.so.cache"}},
{"open": {"type": "whitelist","access_type": "read",
"filename": "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6"}},
{"open": {"type": "whitelist","access_type": "read",
"filename": "/usr/bin/which"}}
]}
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CHAPTER 4
EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate both the impact of the probes on the performance
of the guest and on the ability of the IDS to detect a real world attack on a
popular cloud based web application.
4.1 Performance
To evaluate the overhead of our probing mechanisms driven by guest events,
we run three benchmarks that are representative of cloud workloads. These
include:
• Apache Bench - a web serving benchmark for the Apache web server,
[26],
• Redis Bench - a benchmark for the in memory data store [27],
• OpenSSL Profiling - used to understand the impact on encrypted com-
munication within guests.
These tests were chosen because they represent a disk-read heavy work-
load (Apache), network heavy workload (Redis, Apache), and a CPU heavy
workload (OpenSSL). Web applications will often call in memory caches be-
fore sending a response using Apache configured with OpenSSL. All tests are
configured using the Phoronix Test Suite and are run 90 times each. The first
30 runs are performed with our trusted probes loaded and then we run 30
without. The last 30 runs are done while having probes loaded at the general
system call handler, before interrupts have been re-enabled in the guest to
highlight the performance penalty paid while protecting against A5. Figure.
4.1 shows the results for both Apache Bench and for OpenSSL. The results
have been normalized to running in a guest without probing. Apache bench
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results are in terms of requests served per second and those for OpenSSL
are in terms of signatures generated per second, but here both have simply
been normalized to highlight the percentage decrease in performance caused
by probing. Figure. 4.2 is for the Redis benchmark, which runs five separate
requests types to the in memory data store.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Specific	Handler Generic	Handler Specific	Handler Generic	Handler
Apache OpenSSL
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
	Sl
ow
do
w
n	
	w
ith
	P
ro
be
s
Figure 4.1: Apache Bench and OpenSSL Overhead Relative to Running
with no Probing.
In the case of hooking specific system call handlers, it is clear to see that
overheads remain tolerable (less than 10%), because we are only probing
two guest kernel functions. The overheads are large when protecting against
A5 though, around 55% for Apache and 75% for Redis. Notably, we see
very little slow down for OpenSSL in both cases. This is because OpenSSL
does not have to interact with the kernel as much as Apache and Redis to
complete its workload. OpenSSL works by loading a key in memory and then
generating signatures using that key. It is up to another process, Apache in
our case, to write out any information to the network. Apache and Redis are
both opening sockets and sending data over the network, which is why we
see a much higher penalty being paid when hooking the generic system call
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Figure 4.2: Redis Benchmark Overhead for 5 Redis Operations.
(A) is without probing the guest, (B) is probing only the specific system
call handlers, and (C) is probing the general system call handler.
handler. We feel that the protections against A1, A2, A3, A4 (requirements
D3 and R4) go a long way in protecting the specific system call handler,
substantially reducing the unloggable attack space when hooking only the
specific system call handlers. In future work, we will investigate dynamically
choosing probe location based on observed events. Such an approach could
utilize game theory to model situations in which inserting probes at the
general system call handler is worth the performance penalty. We found
that the majority of overhead when hooking the specific system call handlers
comes from the sys open probe due to the large number of times that system
call is used.
4.2 IDS Evaluation
We evaluate the efficacy of the IDS built on top of our trusted logging plat-
form by looking at real world exploits for motivation. In a recent attack
on the website for the Linux distribution Linux Mint [28], attackers were
able to gain shell access as the www-data user, the user typically reserved for
only running the httpd process [29]. The attack exploited a vulnerability
in the popular blogging framework, Wordpress. Wordpress is representative
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of a typical cloud application as it can be deployed on many VAs to enable
horizontal scalability as show in Figure. 2.1. To see how our system would
have handled such an attack, we installed a copy of Wordpress and a typical
plugin and attacked the setup using Wordpress Vulnerability Database ID
#8209 [30].
We first setup a Wordpress application server and separate database server
to act as our VAs. Since our IDS supports policy stacking, we are able to
record a separate policy for Wordpress and use the dhcp.policy file common
to all VAs built using the same base Ubuntu 14.04 LTS distribution. Includ-
ing that policy is necessary as it removes the chance of false positives every
time a dhcp lease renewal is performed. It would not be necessary for VAs
using static IP’s. An abridged version of the wordpress policy file is show in
Listing 4.1. Our policy recording utility produced a policy that served as a
starting point and then we used knowledge about proper wordpress installs
to fine tune the policy. For example, the policy recording utility produced
many single filename: /var/www/html/*.php entries. We removed these
and converted it into a single directory: /var/www/html entry as shown
on the first line of the policy in the listing.
Listing 4.1: Abridged wordpress.policy file
{"open": {"type": "whitelist","access_type": "read",
"directory": "/var/www/html"}},
{"open": {"type": "whitelist","access_type":"create",
"directory": "/var/www/html/wp-content/uploads"}},
{"open": {"type": "whitelist","access_type":"modification",
"directory": "/var/www/html/wp-content/uploads"}},
{"open": {"type": "whitelist","access_type":"read",
"directory": "/var/www/html/wp-content/uploads"}},
{"open": {"type": "whitelist","access_type":"create",
"directory": "/var/www/html/wp-content/plugins"}},
{"open": {"type": "whitelist","access_type":"modification",
"directory": "/var/www/html/wp-content/plugins"}},
{"open": {"type": "whitelist","access_type":"read",
"directory": "/var/www/html/wp-content/plugins"}},
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{"open": {"type": "whitelist","access_type":"create",
"directory": "/var/www/html/wp-content"}},
{"open": {"type": "whitelist","access_type":"modification",
"directory": "/var/www/html/wp-content"}},
{"open": {"type": "whitelist","access_type":"read",
"directory": "/var/www/html/wp-content"}},
We exploit the vulnerability using Metasploit [31] to determine if our alert-
ing system is able to capture anomalous events. Because the exploit works
by injecting arbitrary PHP code, we can only detect attacks that use PHP to
access other files on the system (outside of the /var/www/html directory) or
execute system binaries. We detect the exploit immediately upon the attack
dropping into a shell, as /bin/sh should never execute on the system. We
could detect the exploit sooner by adding an extra probe to sys socket. In
future work, we will explore detection coverage and delay in relationship to
the overheads paid by guests (when only hooking specific system call han-
dlers) to determine which functions to probe.
Our approach relies on the fact that many exploits require a binary to
load and execute on a system. And if the exploit does not run in a separate
process, as is the case in the example given above, the attacker will likely
either execute a system binary or open a file, revealing malicious activity
(assuming an oracle exists that can classify logged events). For instance, the
loading of kernel modules could be audited by looking at events of type Tse
with filename equal to insmod. This would potentially reveal the loading
of a rootkit. We note here however that there are certain limitations to our
approach that would allow an attacker to commit a malicious action without
being logged. Consider a vulnerable binary running on a system that is com-
promised through a buffer overflow attack. Assuming the attacker does not
crash the binary, it might be possible to run code under an already executing
binary. Payload code could then explore the full system call interface and
potentially exploit the running kernel. Such an event would not be logged,
though any attempt to remove our probe using such an exploit would be
noted in the log. While the attack event itself would not be logged, any
rootkit loaded in such a manner could not hide invocations of a userspace
application making sys exec and sys open system calls. This increases the
25
burden of carrying out a successful attacks as malicious payloads will have to
be carried out within a vulnerable binary or the kernel to go undetected. In
future work we will explore creating probes for the most vulnerable locations
within the Linux kernel by evaluating past exploits.
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CHAPTER 5
RELATED WORK
Huh et al. discuss a trusted logging architecture for grid computing using
Xen [25]. Their approach relies on logging events as they are intercepted by
Xen device drivers. Our trusted logging is more flexible as any action within
the guest can be logged on instruction execution. Additionally, the authors
propose an extensive architecture for guaranteeing the log is not fabricated
by the provider. We view this work as complementary. Thus far, we have
focused on trust related issues related to log generation and can utilize similar
techniques for improving trustworthiness.
Montanari et al. discuss using VMI for integrity checking of credit card
security policies for monitored guests [32]. We share similar goals in that
the authors wanted to perform compliance auditing with the least amount of
evidence. Our system builds on or extends on these ideas by implementing
a trusted event based logging system on which compliance audits could then
be performed.
Crawford et al. discuss a methodology for detecting insider threats that
relies on scanning the memory of running virtual machines every 30 min-
utes [11]. As we discussed earlier, polling techniques such as this are limited
in that they are easily circumvented, giving attackers a 30 minute window
in which to perform malicious activities. Kienzle et al. explore using VMI
techniques for endpoint configuration compliance, but require the compli-
ance audit package run in a separate VM, increasing the resources of the
monitor [33]. Their approach to compliance also relies on polling, thus can
be circumvented. Our approach provides a trusted log which is guaranteed
to capture every event probed. In future work, we intend to use our trusted
event log to perform compliance checks of Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
systems running within the guests. Win et al. propose using VMI to provide
additional layers of security for a similar system, but rely on information
from a trusted in-guest monitoring agent to report relevant accesses to a
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trusted compliance layer VM [34]. Our approach places no trust in the guest
after the initial kernel is loaded using an attestation technique provided by
a TPM.
KvmSec is a security extension for KVM, but relies on probes running
in untrusted guests [35]. Numerous papers have been published regarding
detection of specific kinds of malware. For example, Liu et al. address
issues related to the “Heartbleed” OpenSSL vulnerability using a VMM [12].
AntFarm and Lycosid both present ways to address the semantic gap and
track running processes on guests [7, 2]. Our approach uses event based
probing, thus will not miss events while having less overhead when compared
to a system that requires running a separate trusted VM from which to
perform monitoring.
In “Space Traveling across VM” [8], the authors cross the semantic gap
by relying on an additional virtual machine from which to run probes. This
approach has a large over head, thus would violate R6. Techniques like
“Virtuoso” are complimentary to our trusted log and could be used to in-
form future probes of relevant locations within the guest for probing [36].
With regards to work related to IDS, Kosoresow and Hofmeyr show the ef-
fectiveness of system call traces by using temporal patterns of system calls to
detect intrusions [37]. While the IDS presented here relies upon white-listing,
their technique could also be applied. Performance considerations and tech-
niques to improve the performance of logging with kprobes is discussed by
Feng et al. [38]. While our approach does not use kprobes, their techniques
for improving the performance of the communication between kernel space
and user space may prove to be useful in future work.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have shown the events that must be logged when prob-
ing guest instructions from within a VMM to ensure attempts to circumvent
logging can be audited by higher level services. We show how existing instruc-
tion replacement based probing mechanisms must be extended to include a
mechanism to guarantee that every invocation of a probed instruction trig-
gers an event. We do this by inducing a unique sequence of EPT violations
to guarantee probes placed in a guest kernel are placed before the instruc-
tion can be invoked. We also identify two new events that must be added
to ensure attempts to circumvent logging can be audited. These events will
allow writes to MSRs and the idt to be audited to determine if an attacker
is attempting to circumvent probes placed in system calls.
We highlight a methodology for creating trustworthy services built on top
of instruction based probes. Namely, attempts to circumvent probes must
be well understood and handled appropriately. This requires one consider
not just protection of the instruction being replaced by the probing mecha-
nism, but protection for every instruction that transfers control flow to the
probed instruction. We highlight five requirements that drive this methodol-
ogy. These include control flow considerations (R1), log integrity protections
(R2), probe robustness (R3), calling function considerations (R4), and a
requirement that logged data contain every event up to and including an at-
tempt to circumvent logging (R5). Additionally, we try to adhere to design
goals to minimize the performance impact on guests (D1), reduce additions
to the trusted compute base (D2) and require not guest modifications (D3).
We also outline potential attacks against an event-driven log and show how
such attacks can be audited.
To highlight how higher level services can be built on a trusted log, we
developed a white-list based IDS and policy recording system. The IDS aims
to provide defense-in-depth to VAs. Cloud computing and the prevalence
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of VAs allows for more complete white-listing with fewer false positives as
VAs are commonly deployed to perform a single task. Any deviation from
that task is a potential security violation. We demonstrate the effectiveness
of our system using a real world vulnerability. Finally, we have shown the
performance trade-offs required to protect against attack vectors when using
hypervisor-based probing mechanisms. In particular, protection against the
preemption attack vector requires a large overhead (55-75% in some bench-
marks). Such an attack would be probabilistic and relaxing our logging
system to not defend against this attack still greatly increases the cost of
carrying out a successful attack against the logging system while providing
more tolerable performance overhead (around 10% in the worst case among
evaluated benchmarks).
In future work we will explore reducing the performance impact so that
guests do not have to choose between protection guarantees and performance
through the usage of Intel’s new #VE exceptions that allow certain EPT
violations to be handled in the guest. When combined with additional logging
mechanisms in the hypervisor (to monitor register writes) this could allow
operations causing the highest performance impact be moved to the guest.
Any code base handling the exception could be protected using a unique
EPT view (also controllable by guests) to ensure that a compromised kernel
could not manipulate the exception handler.
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